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Abstract 
In human-human dialogue, the way in which a piece of information is added to the partners’ 
common ground (i.e., presented and accepted) constitutes an important determinant of 
subsequent dialogue memory. The aim of this study was to determine whether this is also the 
case in human-system dialogue. An experiment was conducted in which naïve participants 
and a simulated dialogue system took turns to present references to various landmarks 
featured on a list. The kind of feedback used to accept these references (verbatim repetition 
vs. implicit acceptance) was manipulated. The participants then performed a recognition test 
during which they attempted to identify the references mentioned previously. Self-presented 
references were recognised better than references presented by the system; however, such 
presentation bias was attenuated when the initial presentation of these references was 
followed by verbatim repetition. Implications for the design of automated dialogue systems 
are discussed. 
 
Keywords 
Human-system dialogue, dialogue memory, common ground, memory biases, feedback, 
Wizard-of-Oz studies 
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Highlights 
 Human dialogue memory is subject to presentation and acceptance biases. 
 The present study examined whether this is also the case in human-system dialogue. 
 Participants interacted over the phone with a simulated dialogue system. 
 Participants were subject to a presentation bias which was attenuated in some cases. 
 Implications for the design of automated dialogue systems are discussed. 
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Explicit feedback from users attenuates memory biases in human-system dialogue 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Human-system dialogue is a goal-oriented activity during which a human being (usually 
referred to as a user) uses language to interact with an automated dialogue system. Such 
interactions are increasingly frequent, as it is not uncommon nowadays to interact with a 
system using natural speech or keywords in order to buy a train ticket or to book a flight (see 
Barrett & Jiang, 2012; Grudin, 2005; Pieraccini & Huerta, 2008; Zhou, 2007).  
 The psychological processes at play in human-system and human-human dialogue are 
supposed similar, as users’ expectations and beliefs regarding dialogue system are analogous 
to those held by human partners engaged in dialogue (e.g., Bergmann, Branigan, & Kopp, 
2015; Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, & McLean, 2010; Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, 
McLean, & Brown, 2011; Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, McLean, & Nass, 2003; Brennan, 
1991, 1996; Cavedon et al., 2015; El Asri, Lemmonier, Laroche, Pietquin, & Khouzaimi, 
2014; Iio et al., 2015; Johnstone, Berry, Nguyen, & Asper, 1995; Kiesler, 2005; Koulouri, 
Lauria, & Macredie, 2015; Le Bigot, Caroux, Ros, Lacroix, & Botherel, 2013; Powers et al., 
2005; Suzuki & Katagiri, 2007; van Lierop, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2012; Zoltan-Ford, 
1991). In this sense, dialogue psychology provides important insight for the development of 
automated dialogue systems. In particular, one major finding is that human dialogue partners 
attempt to produce partner-adapted utterances as they interact (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark 
& Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2012). To do so, they rely on their memory 
for past interactions, or dialogue memory (e.g., Gibbs, 1986; Keenan, MacWhinney, & 
Mayhew, 1977; Le Bigot et al., 2013; Pasupathi & Hoyt, 2010). However, such memory is 
subject to a number of biases which cause some of the encoded pieces of information to 
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become less readily accessible than others (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2015; Knutsen, Ros, & Le 
Bigot, in press). The first goal of the current study is to determine whether these biases are 
also observed when a human user interacts with a dialogue system. Verifying this assumption 
would imply that users are likely to systematically have difficulty remembering part of the 
information produced by the system. Accordingly, the second goal of this study is to 
determine how these biases can be attenuated, in particular by manipulating the kind of 
feedback produced by humans and systems during the interaction. 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes literature on 
human-human and human-system dialogue. The current study, which involved interactions 
between naïve participants and a simulated dialogue system, is described in Section 3. The 
results are reported in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 includes directions for 
future research. 
 
2. Theoretical background: Dialogue memory in human-human interactions 
 
Collaborative dialogue is an activity during which at least two partners interact in order to 
reach a common goal (Clark, 1992, 1996) and which might involve human partners only or 
human(s) and automated dialogue systems (see Klein, Feltovich, Bradshaw, & Woods, 2005).  
 Dialogue partners attempt to adapt to each other by favouring the production of easily 
understandable utterances not only at the beginning of the interaction, but also during the 
remainder of the dialogue. For instance, human partners talking about pictures of New York 
buildings adapt the references they use to designate the buildings depending on whether their 
partner knows New York well (in which case they might produce the reference “the Empire 
State Building”) or not (in which case they might produce the reference “the pointy 
building”) (Isaacs & Clark, 1987; see also Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
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1986; Nückles, Winter, Wittwer, Herbert, & Hübner, 2006). In a similar way, users 
interacting with a dialogue system about everyday objects reuse the same references to these 
objects as those previously used by the system, as they assume that the system should be 
capable of understanding them again (Bergmann et al., 2015; Branigan et al., 2011; Iio et al., 
2015; for other examples, see also Branigan et al., 2003; Cavedon et al., 2015; Kiesler, 2005; 
Koulouri et al., 2015; Powers et al., 2005; Suzuki & Katagiri, 2007; Zoltan-Ford, 1991). 
To determine what his or her partners are capable of understanding, each partner 
relies on the common ground, which consists in the knowledge and information that two 
dialogue partners share and are aware of sharing (in human dialogue) or the information 
which the user believes to be shared with the system (in human-system dialogue). Part of the 
common ground consists in the information produced earlier during the current interaction or 
during past interactions. Precisely, information is added to the common ground through a 
joint contribution process (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986; for a generalisation to human-system dialogue, see Brennan & Hulteen, 1995; 
Cahn & Brennan, 1999). One of the speakers starts by presenting a piece of information. For 
instance, Speaker A might say: “I would like to go to the cinema on Saturday.” during an 
interaction with Speaker B. The latter then accepts this information, that is, he or she 
indicates that he or she believes that the information presented was understood well enough 
for current purposes. Acceptance is more or less explicit: Speaker B might accept the 
utterance produced by A by repeating it verbatim, by saying “okay” or by nodding his or her 
head. In any event, once presented and accepted, the information is added to the speakers’ 
common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991; McInnes & Attwater, 2004); in this example, this 
would imply that both A and B are aware that they both know that A would like to go to the 
cinema on Saturday. Either speaker may then resort to it for subsequent adaptation purposes. 
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The partners’ capacity to remember what was said previously is therefore a central 
determinant of successful partner-adaptation. 
Importantly, studies on human dialogue suggest that dialogue memory is more or less 
accurate depending on whether one needs to retrieve initially self- or partner-produced 
information from memory (Hjelmquist, 1984; Jarvella & Collas, 1974; Knutsen & Le Bigot, 
2015; Stafford, Burggraf, & Sharkey, 1987; Stafford & Daly, 1984). For instance, Knutsen 
and Le Bigot (2015; see also Knutsen et al., in press) have recently shown that the distinction 
between self- and partner-production at the time of common ground construction directly 
affects dialogue memory. Indeed, after the end of an interaction, each partner remembers the 
information that he or she presented him- or herself better than the information presented by 
his or her partners; information accepted through verbatim repetition is also remembered 
better than information accepted implicitly (regardless of whether the acceptance was self- or 
partner-produced). Such memory biases have important consequences for subsequent partner-
adaptation, as readily accessible information is more likely to be reused in the remainder of 
the interaction (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012, 2014; Knutsen et al., in press). 
 To date, these biases have exclusively been investigated in human-human dialogue. 
However, as mentioned already, similar processes are at play in humans engaged in human-
human dialogue and in users engaged in human-system dialogue (e.g., Brennan, 1991; 
Powers et al., 2005), implying that users should also be subject to presentation and 
acceptance biases. This could have important consequences for human-system dialogue. Most 
users engage in this kind of dialogue in order to obtain pieces of information held by the 
system (e.g., the various stations at which a train calls or the departure time of a plane). If 
users’ dialogue memory for human-system dialogue is subject to a self-presentation bias, this 
would imply that the information obtained from the system (i.e., system-presented 
information) would systematically be remembered less well than the information produced by 
Memory biases in human-system dialogue 
8 
the user him- or herself (i.e., self-presented information). Furthermore, designers may rely on 
the fact that speakers tend to reuse words and structures previously mentioned by the system 
to ensure that users only produce words and structures that the system is capable of 
understanding (e.g., Koulouri et al., 2015; Zoltan-Ford, 1991). However, if the users’ 
dialogue memory is biased towards remembering self-presented information better, then such 
convergence might not occur systematically, thus potentially impairing the interaction.  
 The acceptance bias might have important consequences for human-system dialogue 
as well. In the presentation-acceptance model, acceptance is more or less explicit (Clark & 
Brennan, 1991; Clark & Schaefer, 1989). When acceptance involves verbatim repetition of 
the presented reference, this reference becomes more readily accessible to both speakers 
(compared to references accepted through other means) (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014, 2015; 
Knutsen et al., in press). Such acceptance effect might be sufficient to attenuate the 
presentation effect from the point of view of the speaker performing the acceptance. For 
instance, if a system-presented reference is accepted through verbatim repetition by a user, 
this reference should benefit from a self-production effect (due to verbatim repetition at the 
time of acceptance) from the user’s point of view, just like self-presented references. This 
should result in an increase in accessibility in memory of the system-presented reference, thus 
attenuating the strength of the presentation bias by reducing the difference in accessibility 
between self- and partner-presented references from the user’s point of view. Importantly, 
there are both pros and cons associated with explicit acceptance in human-system dialogue. 
The main advantage associated with the user or the system repeating the information 
presented by the other partner is that it allows this partner to check that the information 
presented was understood correctly (Cahn & Brennan, 1999; Dybkjaer & Bernsen, 2001; 
Dybkjær & Bernsen, 2000). Furthermore, system explicit acceptance can increase user 
satisfaction, especially when the information repeated is important within the context of the 
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task framework (Stent, Dowding, Gawron, Bratt, & Moore, 1999). However, explicit 
repetition by the system is sometimes cumbersome and is not well adapted to all users (e.g., 
to users whose speech is typically well recognised; see Litman & Pan, 1999); in a similar 
way, explicit repetition by the user might feel unnatural and not always necessary. 
Furthermore, explicit repetition (by the system and/or by the user) decreases the efficiency of 
the interaction, as it increases the number of speech turns necessary to complete the task at 
hand (e.g., Wolters et al., 2009), potentially overloading the users’ memory. The results of 
the current study are discussed below in light of these pros and cons. 
In any event, finding presentation and acceptance biases in the current study would be 
in favour of the idea that similar psychological processes are at play in human-human and 
human-system dialogue (Brennan, 1991; Powers et al., 2005). It would also shed light on how 
users represent the content of past interactions with dialogue systems. Such knowledge would 
help understand how this kind of representation is used for subsequent adaptation purposes, 
as memory for past interactions is one of the sources of information used by dialogue partners 
to determine whether or not a piece of information belongs to the common ground (see Clark 
& Schaefer, 1989). 
 
3. Method 
 
The first goal of the current study was to determine whether the self-presentation bias occurs 
in human-system dialogue. The second goal was to determine whether the acceptance bias 
occurs in human-system dialogue as well, and whether it might contribute to reducing the 
self-presentation bias (i.e., the study sought to determine whether encouraging users to accept 
references presented by the system through verbatim repetition attenuates the users’ tendency 
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to remember these references less well than self-presented ones). This section details the 
rationale for this study and the methodology employed. 
 
3.1. Rationale of the experiment, cover story and operational hypotheses 
The current experiment involved an interaction about the location of various types of 
restaurants between a naïve human participant and a simulated dialogue system. Leading 
human participants to believe that they are interacting with a genuine dialogue system when 
the system prompts are in fact controlled by a human confederate is usually referred to as the 
Wizard-of-Oz method (Cohen, Giangola, & Balogh, 2004; Fraser & Gilbert, 1991). This 
method can be used to study human behaviour in human-system-like interaction situations. 
Its main advantage is that it offers complete control over the content of the system prompts.  
Each participant was led to believe that the experiment was part of a large-scale 
ergonomics project whose goal was to develop a dialogue system which would help users to 
locate restaurants in surrounding areas. He or she was told that the system was still in its 
phase test and that the goal of this experiment was to provide the system with opportunities to 
learn through genuine phone interaction with a human being. The experimenter then gave the 
participant a list of restaurants defined in terms of category (e.g., “Italian”), price (e.g., “20 
euros”) and location (e.g., “covert market”) and explained that these were the only restaurants 
the system was currently capable of locating. The experimenter also explained that the system 
only understood queries using the syntax “Where is the [category] restaurant that costs 
[price]?” (e.g., “where is the Italian restaurant that costs 20 euros?”) and answers using the 
syntax “it is next to [location]” (e.g., “it is next to the covert market”). The participant was 
told that his or her task was to produce queries and replies similar to the queries and replies 
the final system would have to manage. 
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The purpose of this experimental setup was to give the participant the opportunity to 
present references and to accept references presented by the system. The main manipulation 
concerned the kind of acceptance used by the participant and the system to accept the 
references presented. In one condition, the references were accepted through verbatim 
repetition; in the other condition, these were accepted implicitly. At the end of the 
experiment, the participant performed a memory (recognition) task during which he or she 
identified the references produced during the interaction with the system. The participant also 
completed a French translation of the SUS (System Usability Scale) (Brooke, 1996) in order 
to examine whether the kind of acceptance used affected the participants’ perception of the 
system.  
Three hypotheses were tested in this study. All three hypotheses concerned the 
participants’ recognition of the references mentioned during the interaction. The first 
hypothesis (Presentation Hypothesis) was that self-presented target references are more likely 
to be recognised than partner-presented (i.e., system-presented) target references. The second 
hypothesis (Acceptance Hypothesis) was that target references accepted through verbatim 
repetition are more likely to be recognised during the memory task than target references 
accepted through another mean. Finally, we have suggested above that the presentation bias 
should be attenuated for the user when the reference presented by the system is then accepted 
explicitly by the user. Accordingly, the third hypothesis (Attenuation Hypothesis) was that 
the presentation bias (i.e., the participants’ tendency to remember self-presented target 
references better and system-presented target references less well) is weaker when target 
references accepted through verbatim repetition than for target references accepted through 
another mean.  
 
3.2. Participants 
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Fifty-two undergraduate students (41 female; mean age 20.2, SD = 2.3) took part in the 
experiment in exchange for partial course credit. All participants were native French 
speakers. They signed an informed consent form before the beginning of the experiment and 
were fully debriefed after the end of the experiment. At that point, the experimenter also 
explained about the simulated dialogue system and made sure that none of the participants 
had guessed that the system prompts were in fact controlled by a human confederate (no 
participant had suspected this). 
 
3.3. Apparatus and materials 
As specified above, the current study involved interacting with a dialogue system about the 
location of restaurants in a French town. Lists of restaurants, maps, a Wizard-of-Oz dialogue 
system and a usability scale were used to this end. These are described in more detail in this 
section. 
 
3.3.1. “Category-location-price” items and lists 
Twenty-four restaurant categories (which corresponded to 24 restaurant categories found on 
the French website http://www.linternaute.com), 24 prices (going from five euros to 62 
euros) and 24 locations (which were randomly selected from the maps used by Knutsen & Le 
Bigot, 2012, 2014, 2015; what's more, the map used in the current study represented the same 
area as the map used by Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012, Experiment 1) were randomly associated 
to create twenty-four “category-location-price” items included in the lists used by the 
participants to interact with the simulated dialogue system (see Appendix A for an example). 
Seven different lists were created for the purpose of the experiment. Each list featured all 24 
items in a different (random) order. These seven lists were printed on A4 paper. 
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 Four of these items (“Polish – 7 euros – Church”, “Thai – 60 euros – Airport”, 
“Sicilian – 62 euros – Administrative Centre” and “Ethiopian – 5 euros – Gym”) were “error 
items”. When these items were mentioned during the experiment, the system systematically 
committed a mistake (see below for more information about the features of these items); the 
purpose of these “error items” was to increase the credibility of the cover story used: the 
participants were led to believe that the system was still in its test phase, so it was likely to 
commit this kind of mistake. 
 
3.3.2. Maps 
A map featuring the locations included in the lists was created for the purpose of the 
experiment. It featured a total of 40 landmarks, 24 of which were the landmarks featured on 
the list and the remaining 16 were distractors (just like the 24 target landmarks used in this 
study, these 16 distractors were randomly taken from the materials used by Knutsen & Le 
Bigot, 2012, 2014, 2015). Two different versions of the map were created and printed on A4 
sheets; the (random) position of each landmark varied across maps, ensuring that the 
participants’ performance on the memory test was not due to the location of the landmarks on 
the map (see Appendix B for an example of a map). The participants were told that the map 
made the experiment more naturalistic, as end users would probably have at least some 
background knowledge of the town in which queries would be conducted. In reality, the aim 
of this was to make sure that the participants were familiar with the map used during the 
subsequent memory test, thus ensuring that the participants’ performance was not simply due 
to them being unfamiliar with the map used. 
 
3.3.3. Simulated dialogue system 
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The dialogue system included four components: a welcome component, an interaction 
component, a closing component and a help component. Because the experimental 
manipulation took place during the interaction component, only this component is detailed 
here; the other three components, whose sole purpose was to make the interaction more 
realistic, are presented in more detail in Appendix C. 
 The interaction component consisted in 24 trials, each corresponding to one of the 
items featured on the list. Each trial was divided into three parts (query, reply, feedback). The 
target reference was presented as part of the reply and accepted as part of the feedback. Two 
trial examples are provided in Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
 All of the system prompts were pre-recorded by an artificial female voice in .mp3 
format using the Voxygen Expressive Speech technology (http://www.voxygen.fr), a corpus-
based concatenative synthesis. The voice used was “Agnès”, which is described as “mature, 
very intelligible, institutional and natural”. The pitch of this voice varies between 110Hz and 
265Hz. The bitrate of the recordings was 64 kbps and the sampling frequency was 44,100 Hz. 
 An HTML interface was built containing hyperlinks to the recordings, each of which 
could be played by simply clicking on the corresponding hyperlink. This interface could be 
accessed from the confederate’s computer, which was in a different room from the 
experimental room used by the participant. The interactions between the participants and the 
Wizard of Oz system were recorded using Audacity. 
 The participant and the confederate interacted over the phone. The Wizard of Oz 
interface was connected to a land phone; as for the participant, he or she used a mobile phone 
to call the system. 
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3.3.4. Usability scale 
The SUS (System Usability Scale) is a questionnaire which is easy to administrate and which 
represents a valid means of quickly assessing the usability of a system (Bangor, Kortum, & 
Miller, 2008; Brooke, 1996). In this questionnaire, the participant is asked to indicate his or 
her agreement with ten statements by giving a number between 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 
(strongly agree). These statements concern (1) the frequency with which the participant 
would like to use the system, (2*) its complexity, (3) it ease of use, (4*) whether they thought 
they would need technical support to use the system, (5) whether they found the various 
functions of the system well integrated, (6*) whether they thought there was too much 
inconsistency in the system, (7) whether they thought that most people could learn to use the 
system quickly, (8*) the system’s cumbersomeness, (9) their confidence in using the system 
and (10*) whether they needed to learn a lot of things before they could start using the system 
(the asterisk denotes scales which were reversed when calculating each participant’s final 
score, as described below). This scale was translated into French for the purposes of this 
study. 
 
3.4. Task and procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, the participant was installed in a quiet experimental room 
and was explained the cover story by the experimenter.  
The experiment was divided in three phases. At the beginning of the first phase 
(dialogue phase), the participant was given a list of 24 restaurants and a map of a French 
town in which these restaurants were supposedly located. The experimenter then dialled the 
number used to reach the system on a mobile phone which she then handed over to the 
participant. 
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This phase was divided in 24 trials. In half of these (i.e., trials in which the target 
reference was partner-presented), the participant was required to use the category and price 
information given in the list to formulate a query and to provide a feedback indicating 
whether or not the system’s reply was correct. For instance, if the participant asked “where is 
the restaurant that costs 20 euros?”, his or her task was then to make sure that the reply 
produced by the system corresponded to the location reported in the list (i.e., “it is next to the 
covert market”) and to say whether this reply was correct or not. In the other half of trials 
(i.e., trials in which the target reference was self-presented), the participant was required to 
use the location information given in the list to answer the query formulated by the system; 
the system then produced a feedback indicating whether or not the participant’s reply was 
correct. For instance, if the system asked “where is the restaurant that costs 20 euros?”, the 
participant’s task was to answer “it is next to the covert market” and to listen to the feedback 
produced by the system. 
The main manipulation concerned the kind of feedback produced by the participants 
and the simulated system. In the “Acceptance through verbatim repetition” condition, the 
target reference presented during the preceding speech turn was repeated (e.g., “correct, it is 
next to the town hall”); in other words, the target reference was accepted through verbatim 
repetition in this condition. In the “Implicit acceptance” condition, the target reference 
presented during the preceding speech turn was not repeated (e.g., “correct”); in other words, 
the target reference was accepted implicitly in this condition. The type of feedback produced 
by the participant and the system was the same (i.e., if the participant was instructed to use 
verbatim repetition [or implicit acceptance] in his/her feedback, the system also used 
verbatim repetition [or implicit acceptance]). In both conditions, if the reply produced was 
incorrect, the partner simply said “incorrect”. As mentioned above, the items discussed in 
four of the trials were “error items”: the system systematically committed a mistake in these 
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trials. This mistake consisted in providing an incorrect location in trials where the query was 
produced by the participant or in indicating that the reply produced by the participant was 
incorrect even if this was not the case in trials where the query was produced by the system. 
Queries were produced following the order in which the restaurants were featured on 
the list given to the participant. At the end of each trial, the system produced a transition 
prompt (either “it’s now your turn to produce a query” or “it’s now my turn to produce a 
query”), indicating to the participant which role he or she would play in the following trial. 
The participant and the system switched roles (i.e., asking a question or answering a 
question) after each trial. 
 At the end of the dialogue phase, the participant hung up the mobile phone and gave it 
back to the experimenter. He or she then performed a distraction task during which he or she 
counted backwards from 100 in threes for one minute before embarking on the second phase 
of the experiment (recognition phase). During this phase, the participant was asked to circle 
all of the landmarks mentioned during the interaction with the system on the map. 
 Finally, during the third phase (usability assessment phase), the participant completed 
a usability survey adapted from the SUS. Each of the statements was read out loud by the 
experimenter; the participant then indicated whether he or she agreed by giving a number 
between 1 and 5 (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 The participant was fully debriefed after the end of the experiment. At this point, the 
experimenter made sure that he or she had not suspected that the system prompts were in fact 
controlled by a human being. 
 The experiment was not limited in time and usually lasted less than 20 minutes. A 
recap of the procedure can be found in Figure 2. 
 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
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3.5. Experimental design 
Two independent variables (IV) were used in this study. The Presentation IV referred to 
whether the target references had been presented by the participant or by the system. This 
was a within-participants IV with two modalities (self-presented, partner-presented; note that 
the modality labels reflect the participant’s point of view). The Acceptance IV referred to 
whether these references were then accepted through verbatim repetition or implicitly by the 
other partner. This was a between-participants IV with two modalities (accepted through 
verbatim repetition, accepted implicitly). 
 
3.6. Data coding and dependent variables 
 The purpose of the current study was to examine whether presentation and acceptance 
affected the participants’ memory for the references to landmarks produced during the 
interaction. The participants were also asked to rate the usability of the system. Thus, two 
dependent variables were used in this study: landmark recognition and usability assessment. 
These two variables are described below. 
 
3.6.1. Landmark recognition 
Each landmark which had been referred to during the dialogue phase was coded depending 
on whether or not it was recognised by the participant during the second phase of the 
experiment (i.e., whether or not the participant had circled it on the map). This level of 
coding served as the binary outcome in the main statistical analysis. 
 
3.6.2. Assessment of system usability 
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A usability score was calculated for each participant following the procedure described by 
Brooke (1996). For each participant, the score contributions for each item were summed (for 
items 1 [frequency of use], 3 [ease of use], 5 [integration of the various functions of the 
system], 7 [how quickly other people could learn to use the system] and 9 [confidence in 
using the system], the score contribution was the figure given by the participant minus one; 
for all other items, the score contribution was five minus the figure given by the participant). 
The sum of scores was then multiplied by 2.5. The figure obtained (one per participant; the 
SUS score could potentially range from 0 to 100) reflected how usable this participant found 
the dialogue system. This level of coding served as the numeric outcome in the analysis on 
usability. 
 
4. Results 
 
The analysis of the data from the recognition phase and the usability assessment phase were 
divided into three steps. First, a preliminary analysis assessed the false error rate during the 
recognition phase. Second, an analysis was conducted to determine whether landmark 
recognition depended on presentation and acceptance during the dialogue phase. This was the 
main analysis, as it intended to test the three hypotheses (Presentation, Acceptance and 
Attenuation hypotheses) presented above. Finally, one last analysis was conducted to 
determine whether Acceptance also affected the participants’ perception of the simulated 
dialogue system. 
 
4.1. Preliminary analysis of false alarm rate 
The number of false alarms (i.e., the number of cases in which a participant circled a 
landmark which had not been referred to during the dialogue phase) was 25, implying that the 
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false alarm rate was 3% (25 distractors circled out of 832 [16 distractors * 52 participants] = 
0.03). This fairly low false alarm rate allows discarding the possibility that the participants 
simply circled all of the landmarks featured on the map during the recognition phase. 
 
4.2. Analysis 1: The influence of reference Presentation and Acceptance on subsequent 
landmark recognition 
The recognition data were analysed using logistic mixed models. Logistic models in general 
are used in cases where the outcome variable is binary, which was the case here (a landmark 
was either recognised or not) (Jaeger, 2008). Logistic mixed models in particular are used in 
cases where there is more than one measure per participant (in this study, there was one 
measure per item from the dialogue phase). One of the indicators used in logistic regression is 
the odds ratio (OR), which compares the odds of two events occurring. For instance, in the 
current study, the odds of reusing self-presented references were compared with the odds of 
reusing partner-presented references. If partner-presented references were used as the 
reference category and that an odds ratio of 2 was found, this would mean that two self-
presented references were recognised correctly for each partner-presented reference 
recognised correctly (see Jaccard, 2001) 
As for mixed models, they allow introducing by-participants random intercepts and 
slopes (respectively accounting for potential variations across participants and for the fact 
that the participants might differ in their sensitivity to within-participants IVs) as well as by-
items random intercepts and slopes (respectively accounting for potential variations across 
items and for the fact that the items might differ in their sensitivity to within-items IVs) 
(Barr, 2013; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). The data were analysed using SAS 9.4 
(GLIMMIX procedure). 
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 The data from “error items” were removed from the analysis. Indeed, the mistakes 
committed by the system might have led the participants to pay more attention to the 
landmarks produced, thus increasing the accessibility in memory of corresponding references. 
The data from nine trials were also removed from the analysis due to technical issues (these 
were trials in which a participant failed to follow the instructions, e.g. trials in which the 
participant asked the system about a restaurant which was not in the list or trials in which the 
participant did not formulate a query, or answer the system’s query, when prompted to do so). 
These data were not taken into account in the false alarm rate. As a result of this, the number 
of observations in each cell of the design was unbalanced, which was accounted for in the 
analysis by applying the Satterthwaite correction (Keselman, Algina, Kowalchuk, & 
Wolfinger, 1999; Satterthwaite, 1946). 
The number of references recognised correctly by the participants is reported in Table 
1. 
 
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
4.2.1. Model used and results of the main analysis 
The statistical model used to analyse the data included Presentation, Acceptance and the 
interaction between these two factors as fixed effects and Recognition as the binary outcome. 
Following Barr et al. (2013), the first analysis conducted included the maximal random 
effects structure justified by the design (i.e., a random effects structure including by-
participants and by-items random intercepts as well as by-participants random slopes 
corresponding to Presentation and by-items random slopes corresponding to Presentation, 
Acceptance and the interaction between these two factors). However, this analysis failed to 
converge due to the fact that the variance associated with some of the random effects was 
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equal to zero. Following Kiernan, Tao, and Gibbs (2012) these effects were identified (this is 
done automatically in SAS) and removed from the model; this had no effect on the outcome 
of the analysis. Specifically, the random effects causing convergence issues in the analysis 
were the by-participants random slopes corresponding to Presentation and the by-participant 
random slopes corresponding to the interaction between Presentation and Acceptance. These 
were removed from the final analysis.  
The covariance parameter estimates and the results of the final analysis are reported in 
Appendix D. As expected, the effect of Presentation on Recognition was significant, F(1, 51) 
= 9.88, p = .003: participants were more likely to recognise self-presented references than 
partner-presented references, OR = 1.62, CI.95 = 1.19, 2.20. No significant effect of 
Acceptance on Recognition was found, F(1, 36) < .001, p = .985. However, the interaction 
between Presentation and Acceptance was significant, F(1, 51) = 5.11, p = .028. The 
difference between self- and partner-presented references was weaker when they had been 
accepted through verbatim repetition than when they had been accepted implicitly, as 
predicted, b = - 0.69, p = .028 (see Figure 3).  
 
Insert Figure 3 around here 
 
4.2.2. Pairwise comparisons 
Additional pairwise comparisons (whose p-values were corrected using Sequential 
Bonferroni) revealed that the difference between self- and partner-presented references was 
significant for references accepted implicitly, p = .002, but that this difference was non-
significant for references accepted through verbatim repetition, p = 1.00.  
Importantly, Figure 2 might give the impression that the interaction was due to 
implicit acceptance increasing the accessibility in memory of self-presented references and 
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decreasing the accessibility of partner-presented references. However, the difference between 
self-presented references accepted through verbatim repetition and self-presented references 
accepted implicitly was not significant, p = 1.00, and the difference between partner-
presented references accepted through verbatim repetition and partner-presented references 
accepted implicitly was not significant either, p =1.00. Thus, this explanation was not 
supported by the data. 
 
4.3. Analysis 2: Influence of Acceptance on usability 
The purpose of the second analysis was to determine whether the kind of acceptance used by 
the participants and the system affected the participants’ perception of the system. The SUS 
data were analysed using a one-way between-participants ANOVA including Acceptance as 
the IV and the participants’ SUS scores as the numeric dependent variable. This analysis was 
conducted in SPSS 21.  
Two preliminary analyses revealed that the normality assumption (Shapiro-Wilk test; 
verbatim acceptance condition: p = .320; implicit acceptance condition; p = .113) and the 
homogeneity of variance assumption (Levene’s test, p = .549, based on means) were met. 
However, the main analysis revealed no significant effect of Acceptance on the participants’ 
SUS scores, F < 1, p = .749 (see Table 2). 
 
Insert Table 2 around here 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine users’ dialogue memory for human-system 
interactions. When two human partners interact, they remember better self-presented 
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information and/or information accepted through verbatim repetition (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 
2015; Knutsen et al., in press). Is this also the case when a human user interacts with a 
system? To answer this question, the current study examined participants’ recognition of 
references to landmarks presented and accepted during an interaction with a simulated 
dialogue system. 
 First, the results confirmed that the participants remembered the references they had 
presented themselves better than the references that had been presented by the system, 
confirming that the self-presentation bias also occurs in human-system dialogue (Knutsen & 
Le Bigot, 2015; Knutsen et al., in press). This is also in line with the idea that similar 
psychological processes are at play when human beings interact with other humans or with 
automated dialogue systems (Brennan, 1991; Powers et al., 2005). 
The self-presentation bias could potentially hinder human-system interaction. Users 
generally engage in interactions with dialogue systems in order to obtain information they 
currently do not have access to (e.g., a user might start interacting with a system in order to 
obtain the departure time of a flight). However, the self-presentation bias implies that the 
information presented by the system might be difficult to subsequently retrieve from 
memory, or at least more difficult to retrieve from memory than self-presented information. 
In a similar way, if a user produces an erroneous piece of information during the interaction 
and the system corrects him or her, the users might remember the incorrect information better 
than the correct information. Of course, other factors than presentation could affect the user’s 
memory in this case as well – for instance, the system correcting him or her could lead the 
user to pay more attention to what the system says. Nonetheless, if the user believes that his 
or her flight is at 10 o’clock and the system informs him or her that the flight is in fact at 11 
o’clock, the erroneous piece of information might remain particularly accessible in the user’s 
memory due to self-presentation, potentially making this user more likely to arrive at the 
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airport at the wrong time. However, the current study also provides strong evidence that the 
self-presentation bias can be attenuated through acceptance in human-system dialogue. 
Specifically, the effect of acceptance was not statistically significant, failing to replicate a 
finding reported in several studies on human-human dialogue (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012, 
2014, 2015; Knutsen et al., in press) and preventing us from concluding that the acceptance 
bias also occurs in human-system dialogue. This is potentially due to the fact that in previous 
human-human dialogue studies, dialogue partners were free to choose how they accepted the 
information they were presented (i.e., they could choose between accepting a piece of 
information through verbatim repetition, implicitly, or through any other mean). The fact that 
the participants were forced to use verbatim repetition or implicit acceptance in the current 
study might have led them to pay less attention to the feedbacks produced. Nonetheless, the 
expected Presentation x Acceptance interaction was statistically significant in this study, in 
line with the Attenuation Hypothesis (i.e., in line with the idea that the self-presentation bias 
is reduced when presented references are accepted through verbatim repetition in human-
system dialogue). Dialogue system designers can therefore manipulate the nature of the 
feedback required by the system after the presentation of a piece of information to improve 
communication. This could be achieved by having the system explicitly ask the user to repeat 
the information presented. For instance, the system might say: “Your flight is scheduled at 
11.45am. Could you please repeat this information?”. Another possibility would be to train 
the users before they use the system (e.g., using a tutorial) to spontaneously produce such 
explicit feedback. 
What’s more, requiring explicit feedback from users may have additional benefits 
which are not directly related to information accessibility in memory. For instance, accepting 
information through verbatim repetition gives the system an opportunity to check the user’s 
comprehension of the information presented. If the system produces the message: “Your 
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flight is at 11 o’clock” and that the user repeats: “At 10 o’clock”, the system can infer that it 
was not understood correctly and point this out to the user (for similar ideas, see Cahn & 
Brennan, 1999; Dybkjaer & Bernsen, 2001; Dybkjær & Bernsen, 2000). Such 
miscomprehension could have gone unnoticed if the user had produced a less explicit 
feedback. 
Importantly, we do not suggest that users should systematically be required to repeat 
system-presented information. Indeed, doing so could negatively affect the users’ 
representation of the system for at least two reasons. First, it would systematically increase 
the number of speech turns necessary to perform the task underlying the interaction, thus 
potentially overloading the users with information (Wolters et al., 2009); second, the users 
could perceive such repetitions as useless in situations in which their next actions make it 
clear that they have understood the system correctly or in which potential user 
comprehension mistakes would be harmless (see Bernsen, Dybkjær, & Dybkjær, 1994). In 
the current study, no evidence was found that asking the participants to systematically 
provide explicit feedback affected their perception of the system’s usability (i.e., there was no 
evidence that interacting with a system which systematically repeated the references to 
landmarks presented by the participant caused the latter to perceive the system more 
negatively). However, this lack of a significant difference might have been due to the 
experimental nature of the interaction (e.g., the participants in this study were not in a 
particular rush to complete the task, nor did they perceive the task as having high stakes). The 
users’ perception of this kind of system might be quite different in real-life human-system 
interactions, where it should depend on the users’ individual goals and constraints (e.g., it 
could depend on whether or not the users need to perform the task quickly). In this context, 
our recommendation is to encourage users to repeat important information only – that is, 
information whose memorization by the users is central to the task at hand.  
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6. Limitations, plans for future research and conclusion 
The current study presents at least four limitations. First, the experiment conducted involved 
a simulated system rather than a real automated dialogue system. Although the Wizard of Oz 
technique can be used to examine the influence of participants’ beliefs about the nature of 
their partner on their behaviour (Fraser & Gilbert, 1991), the next step of this work will 
consist in attempting to generalise the current results to genuine human-system dialogue. For 
instance, the comprehension capacities of a real dialogue system may differ greatly from 
those of a human confederate, potentially leading to more system comprehension mistakes 
which might cause users to pay more attention to the information and feedback produced by 
the system. Replicating the current findings using a genuine automated dialogue system will 
constitute even stronger evidence (1) that users are subject to memory biases in human-
system dialogue and (2) that acceptance strategies may be used to attenuate these biases. 
Second, in this study, the participants were explicitly instructed to use either verbatim or 
implicit acceptance. In real-life interactions, however, speakers tend to use various kinds of 
acceptance strategies (Clark & Brennan, 1991; McInnes & Attwater, 2004), and the reasons 
which lead speakers to favour one kind of acceptance over another have seldom been 
investigated. Further research is needed to identify the determinants of information 
acceptance in order to determine how to lead users to favour verbatim acceptance when 
important information is presented by the system. Third, the participants in this study were 
mainly female psychology students. This raises the question of the generalisability of the 
results to other populations, as male participants and/or non-student participants could have 
behaved differently in the same experimental setting. Potential changes in the results could be 
due to variations in expertise with dialogue systems, for instance. Thus, future research 
should attempt to generalise the current results to a demographically broader sample. Finally, 
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in this experiment, the SUS questionnaire was administered by the experimenter, who read 
the questions out loud to the participant. This could have biased the participants’ responses 
towards a more positive assessment of the system. To overcome this limitation, this kind of 
questionnaire should be administered in a different way (e.g., giving the participant the 
opportunity to complete it him- or herself) in future studies. 
 Despite these limitations, the results reported here confirm that presentation and 
acceptance play an important role in human-system dialogue. This raises a number of 
theoretical questions. In particular, research on human-human dialogue suggests that 
presentation and acceptance affect not only reference accessibility in memory after the end of 
an interaction, but also reuse throughout that interaction (self-presented and/or references 
accepted through verbatim repetition are more likely to be reused than any other reference; 
Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012, 2014, 2015; Knutsen et al., in press). Future research should seek 
to determine whether this is also the case in human-system dialogue. This would contribute to 
a better understanding of how humans manage dialogue as they interact with a dialogue 
system. In addition, recall that dialogue memory plays a central role in subsequent partner-
adaptation in human-human dialogue, as speakers routinely rely on what was said previously 
to adapt to each other (Brennan & Clark, 1996). If the current results extend to reuse, this 
would suggest that adaptation could be systematically biased towards the production of 
initially self-presented content. This could have negative consequences for the interaction if 
the system relies on linguistic convergence to ensure that users favour the production of 
words and structures that the system is capable of understanding (Koulouri et al., 2015; 
Zoltan-Ford, 1991). 
To conclude, the current study suggests that human-system dialogue is subject to 
biases similar to those found in human-human dialogue (i.e., the self-presentation bias). This 
is in line with the idea that similar psychological processes are at play in both kinds of 
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dialogue. What’s more, in human-system dialogue, the self-presentation bias can be 
attenuated by manipulating the kind of feedback produced by the user, potentially improving 
communication both directly, by increasing the accessibility in memory of partner-presented 
information, and indirectly, by providing the system with a means to verify that the 
information provided to the user was understood correctly.  
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Appendix A: List example 
This is an example of a list used by the participants to interact with the simulated dialogue 
system. Note that this is an English translation: the original lists used in the study were in 
French. 
Category Price Location 
French 22 euros Regional education office 
Tibetan 20 euros Post office 
Chinese 35 euros Prefecture 
Lebanese 52 euros Museum 
Cretan 17 euros Cinema 
Korean 10 euros Town centre 
African 37 euros Roman arena 
Spanish 55 euros Train station 
Portuguese 12 euros Hospital 
American 15 euros Covert market 
Japanese 32 euros Congress centre 
Sicilian 62 euros Administrative centre 
Creole 25 euros Cathedral 
Ethiopian 5 euros Gym 
Belgian 40 euros Park 
Moroccan 42 euros Business school 
Greek 50 euros Music academy 
Caribbean 27 euros Theatre 
Polish 7 euros Church 
Russian 47 euros Library 
Indian 57 euros University 
Mexican 30 euros General council 
Thai 60 euros Airport 
Italian 45 euros Town hall 
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Appendix B: Example of a map used in the experiment 
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Appendix C: Structure of the Wizard of Oz system 
 
During the first part of the interaction (welcome component), the participant listened to a 
welcome message providing him or her with brief instructions as to how to interact with the 
system. The closing prompt of this component was a message indicating who (the participant 
or the system) should produce the first query. 
 The main experimental manipulation was included in the interaction component. In 
this component, the participant and the system took it in turns to produce queries about the 
location of restaurants on the map given to the participant. An additional hypertext link was 
used by the human confederate to request additional information in cases where the 
participant’s query only included one piece of information (i.e., the participant’s query only 
included the category of the restaurant or its price). A second additional link was used by the 
confederate in cases where she did not understand the query produced by the participant 
(because of the quality of the call, or because the participant did not follow the instructions 
given by the experimenter). At the end of each trial, a system prompt informed the participant 
either that it was his or her turn to produce a query or that it was the system’s turn to produce 
a query. 
 The closing component ended the interaction after the 24 trials had been completed by 
the participant. 
 Finally, the help component was used in cases where the participant mentioned that he 
or she needed help interacting with the system. It is noteworthy that this component was 
hardly ever used by the participants, who usually asked their questions directly to the 
experimenter present in the experimental room. 
 The structure of the system is presented in detail in Table A1. 
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Table A1 
Detail of the Structure of the Wizard of Oz System (P = Participant, S = System) 
Component Content (English translation) 
Welcome Welcome to the “Restos par téléphone" platform. This platform allows you to 
interact with the restaurant search system. To produce a query, you can speak 
normally. For instance, at any time, you can obtain help by saying “I want 
help”. 
- Trials in which the first query was produced by the system: It’s now 
my turn to produce a query. 
- Trials in which the first query was produced by the participant: It’s 
now your turn to produce a query. 
 
Interaction 
(x 24) 
Verbatim acceptance condition 
Query produced by the system : 
- S: Where is the Chinese 
restaurant that costs 35 euros? 
- P: It’s next to the prefecture. 
- S: Correct, it’s next to the 
prefecture. 
Query produced by the participant: 
- P: Where is the Chinese 
restaurant that costs 35 euros? 
- S: It’s next to the prefecture. 
- P: Correct, it’s next to the 
prefecture. 
 
Implicit acceptance condition 
Query produced by the system : 
- S: Where is the Chinese 
restaurant that costs 35 euros? 
- P: It’s next to the prefecture. 
- S: Correct. 
-  
Query produced by the participant: 
- P: Where is the Chinese 
restaurant that costs 35 euros? 
- S: It’s next to the prefecture. 
- P: Correct. 
 Cases in which an incomplete query was produced by the participant: 
- You are looking for a Chinese restaurant. Can you specify the price? 
- You are looking for a restaurant that costs 35 euros. Can you specify 
the category? 
 Cases where a problem occurs: I didn’t understand what you said, please 
repeat. 
Transition to a trial where the query was produced by the system: It’s now my 
turn to produce a query. 
Transition to a trial where the query was produced by the participant: It’s 
now your turn to produce a query.  
 
End  Thank you for using “Restos par téléphone”, see you soon. 
 
Help The “Restos par téléphone” test platform allows you to interact with the 
system which will eventually allow users to find restaurants in their town on 
the basis of different criteria. The aim of this platform is to reinforce the 
system’s database. To interact with the system, you can speak normally. 
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Appendix D: Results of the mixed model analysis (final model) 
 
Covariance parameter estimates 
Covariance parameter Subject Estimate Standard error 
Intercept Participant 0.31 0.14 
Presentation Participant 0.16 0.12 
Intercept Item 0.14 0.08 
Acceptance Item 0.02 0.06 
 
Fixed effects 
Effect Estimate Standard error DF p 
Intercept -0.58 0.21 78.48 0.007 
Presentation: self 0.83 0.22 51.57 < .001 
Presentation: partner 0    
Acceptance: verbatim 0.34 0.27 68.92 0.211 
Acceptance: implicit 0    
Interaction: Verbatim – self -0.69 0.31 51.09 0.028 
Interaction: Verbatim - other 0    
Interaction: Implicit - self 0    
Interaction: Implicit – other  0    
 
Test of fixed effects     
Effect Num DF Den DF F p 
Presentation 1 51.15 9.88 0.003 
Acceptance 1 35.74 < .001 0.985 
Interaction 1 51.09 5.11 0.028 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Trial examples. The target reference is italicized in both trials. In the first example 
(upper panel), the target reference is presented by the participant and accepted through 
verbatim repetition by the system. In the second example (lower panel), the target reference is 
presented by the system and accepted through verbatim repetition by the participant.  
 
Figure 2. Recap of the procedure used in the study. The arrow represents the time course of 
the experiment. 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of references recognised as a function of Presentation and Acceptance. 
These proportions were obtained by dividing the number of landmarks recognised in each 
cell of the design by the total number of measures in each cell of the design (self-presented, 
verbatim: 258; self-presented, implicit: 260; partner-presented, verbatim: 256, partner-
presented, implicit: 257).  
 
  
Memory biases in human-system dialogue 
45 
Figure 1 
Partner Prompt type Content 
System Query Where is the Italian restaurant which costs 45 euros? 
Participant Reply It is next to the town hall. 
System Feedback Correct, it is next to the town hall. 
 
Partner Prompt type Content 
Participant Query Where is the French restaurant which costs 22 euros? 
System Reply It is next to the regional education office. 
Participant Feedback Correct, it is next to the regional education office. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Table 1 
Number of Landmarks Recognised during the Second Phase of the Experiment (Recognition 
Phase) as a Function of Presentation and Acceptance 
 Self-presented 
references 
Partner-presented 
references 
Total 
Accepted through verbatim 
repetition 
123 114 237 
Accepted implicitly 145 95 240 
Total 268 209 477 
Note. In this table, the “total” figure (i.e., 477) is the total number of landmarks correctly 
recognised by all of the participants during the recognition phase, regardless of who had 
initially presented the corresponding references and of how these were accepted. 
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Table 2 
Average SUS Scores as a function of Acceptance 
 Verbatim acceptance Implicit acceptance 
Average SUS score 73.58 (14.53) 75.06 (13.31) 
Note. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. 
 
 
